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‘God forbid it should come to that’: the feud between 
Colonel Molesworth and Major-General O’Brien in Portugal, 16631 
 
 
The court martial of Guy Molesworth began on 19 February 1663 in the Portuguese 
town of Moura. Three days later, having taken evidence from numerous officers and 
men of the ‘English’ Brigade (which was in fact Anglo-Irish), the presiding panel found 
the former royalist colonel guilty of speaking reproachful words against Charles II and 
disobeying his superiors. Molesworth was sentenced to death.2 The condemned man 
had made several enemies during his short time in Portugal – not least among them 
Major-General Christopher O’Brien, commanding the Brigade in the absence of his 
brother, the Earl of Inchiquin. After a lifetime of soldiering in Europe and the British 
Isles, followed by equally hazardous escapades in the British Atlantic, Molesworth 
seemed destined for an ignominious end. However, well before the court martial had 
been convened the colonel had alerted his personal network of friends and relatives in 
Whitehall and Lisbon. Influential allies were thus were already fighting to save him – at 
a mounting cost not only to their own political careers but also to international relations 
between England and Portugal. 
 With some notable exceptions, particularly as regards relations between England 
and the Netherlands,3 the study of Charles II’s foreign policy has tended to be 
overshadowed in recent decades by an impressive procession of books and articles 
which have significantly revised our understanding of domestic issues within the British 
kingdoms.4 Much, therefore, has changed since Ronald Hutton observed that neglect of 
the 1660s had caused the history of the English Revolution to read ‘like a marvellous 
story with the last chapter missing’; yet there is still much to explore.5 Steven Pincus’s 
work on the formulation of English foreign policy, and studies by Atlantic scholars such 
as Carla Pestana have highlighted the benefits of considering early modern English (or 
increasingly British) domestic issues in a wider international setting.6 There have been a 
number of works on Anglo-Portuguese relations during the Restoration period, but only 
two published studies of the Anglo-Irish Brigade, in 1960 and 1975 respectively.7 But 
as the events surrounding Molesworth’s court martial will demonstrate, far from being 
out of sight and out of mind the Anglo-Irish Brigade was an acutely sensitive issue, and 
had a wider significance in English politics than has hitherto been appreciated. In order 
to answer the questions arising from the events in Portugal, however, both the events 
and their central character must be viewed in context. The changing political 
environment and the personal circumstances which moulded Molesworth’s career led 
him to a death sentence in Moura, but ultimately provided him with a way out. 
 
* * * 
In February 1635 the teenage Guy Molesworth and William Garfoote of the Inner 
Temple in London were convicted of harassing fellow students and attempting to 
provoke a duel. The eldest son of wealthy Northamptonshire gentry, Molesworth was 
able to deposit £500 as surety for future good behaviour. But by June he was again 
observed taunting a victim in the street and boasting that he cared nothing for his bond. 
He was charged with contempt of court, upon which his father sent him away to Europe 
to learn the art of soldiering in the army of Bernard of Saxe-Weimar.8 
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 Molesworth proved a capable officer. In 1639, by now a company commander, 
he obtained permission to return home to England to join forces being raised by Charles 
I to repress Scotland.9 He was in England by January 1640, when he visited his brother-
in-law Gervase Holles in Lincolnshire, and served as captain-lieutenant in the Earl of 
Northumberland’s regiment during the second Bishops’ War.10 In 1641 he was allotted 
a foot company in forces bound for Ireland. He arrived there in March 1642 under the 
command of Lieutenant-Colonel George Monck, and was soon promoted to major.11 
In 1643, when the King began to recall regiments to serve in the royalist army in 
England, Monck was arrested on suspicion of harbouring parliamentarian sympathies. 
Molesworth, by contrast, was made lieutenant-colonel of Prince Maurice’s regiment of 
horse.12 Molesworth had an influential contact in the shape of his kinsman Holles, now 
a royalist MP and colonel of his own regiment, but the origins of his association with 
Maurice and his brother Prince Rupert are less clear. The closeness of the relationship 
was exemplified in January 1645 when he wrote to Rupert to complain about the 
garrison authorities in Bridgwater.13 Molesworth’s readiness to undermine the chain of 
command had already sparked a quarrel with his local superior Lord Hopton. 
Unabashed, he wrote to the regional commander George Goring to request reassignment. 
When Goring refused Molesworth deserted his post and rode to Rupert in Oxford. This 
was a calculated move: Maurice was already trying to extract his regiment from 
Bridgwater while Goring himself was unpopular with Rupert, having recently persuaded 
the King to grant him exemption from the Prince’s orders. Rupert was predictably 
unsympathetic to Goring’s demands that Molesworth be court-martialled.14 
Nevertheless, Molesworth removed to Bristol to seek the additional protection of the 
Prince of Wales’s Council of War, whose Secretary, Sir Richard Fanshawe, was an 
intimate friend of Holles.15 
When Maurice’s regiment also decamped to Bristol Molesworth resumed 
command. During the Naseby campaign of June 1645 he was wounded and captured: a 
parliamentarian report some months later mentions a skirmish with ‘men of Lt. Col 
Mole, who commands Maurice’s regt and made an escape out of the Tower’.16 This 
incarceration had briefly brought him back into contact with George Monck, who, 
having convinced the royalist authorities of his loyalty, had rejoined the army only to be 
captured in January 1644. Transferred to the Tower in June, Monck was imprisoned 
there for the remainder of the first Civil War. 
Molesworth’s whereabouts between November 1645 and 1647 are uncertain.17 
The period between September 1645 and July 1646 saw the dismissal of Rupert, 
Maurice and many of their associates. Even if he survived this purge, Molesworth’s 
absence from the Calendars of Compounding indicates that his estates were now 
insufficient to interest the Parliamentary Commissioners. Like many royalists, he opted 
to emigrate. 
Together with his wife and daughters, Molesworth arrived on Barbados early in 
1647. Although ostensibly administered by a governor, Barbados was ruled by the 
leading planters sitting on the island’s Assembly. The fact that Molesworth was able to 
become Treasurer of this body is indicative of his ability to construct effective personal 
networks. However, the leading royalists on Barbados, Humphrey and Edward Walrond 
(who had arrived from England in October 1646) were already his enemies. Humphrey 
Walrond had been a leading light in the Bridgwater garrison during the first Civil War – 
the administration for which Molesworth had caused such trouble only two years earlier. 
His appointment was therefore unacceptable to the Walronds. Finding insufficient 
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support among fellow royalists, the brothers turned to the island’s leading 
parliamentarian, James Drax, arguing that Molesworth posed a serious threat to the 
common peace. He was accused of having incited a servant uprising in 1649, and 
having declared that ‘it would never be well in this island, until the Roundheads’ estates 
were given to the poor Cavaliers’.18 Molesworth was arrested, his property seized and, 
he would later claim, his associates tortured. Unable to obtain sufficient evidence to 
justify his execution the Walronds summarily expelled the whole family from the island. 
Following the plundering of their unprotected ship by pirates Molesworth calculated 
that his total losses amounted to £20,000.19 
The family sailed to Virginia. Here Molesworth built up a new plantation, and 
was elected to the colony’s Assembly. When the monarchy was restored in 1660 he was 
among those selected to carry Virginia’s loyal address to Charles II.20 Instead of 
returning to America, however, he made the fateful decision to remain in London and 
seek revenge. In June 1661 in a petition to the House of Lords he attributed the loss of 
his Barbadian estate to the ‘malice and false suggestion of Sir James Drax and others’, 
and demanded restitution.21 Unfortunately, Humphrey Walrond was now beyond his 
reach, having recently been appointed president of the Barbadian Assembly.22 The 
Walrond brothers had seized Barbados for Charles II, and their exile following the 
surrender of the island in 1652 had made them royalist martyrs. Similarly, despite his 
past associations Drax had been reconciled to the restored monarchy and knighted; his 
rehabilitation made smoother by the fact that his closest friend, Sir Thomas Modyford, 
was a kinsman of George Monck (who had now been created Duke of Albemarle in 
recognition of his pivotal role in the Restoration). Molesworth’s petition came to 
nothing.23 
Lobbying was expensive and Molesworth now found himself in debt. Since 
being appointed a Master of Requests at court alongside his friend Sir Richard 
Fanshawe, Gervase Holles had used his position to promote the interests of several 
relatives. Despite his brother-in-law’s best efforts, however, Guy Molesworth was 
granted neither money nor position.24 With debtors’ prison looming he grudgingly 
accepted a commission as captain of a troop of horse in forces being assembled for the 
aid of Portugal. It was to prove an unhappy appointment; so much so that a gloomy 
Molesworth was later heard to utter that he wished that Charles II ‘had sent him to 
Tyburne when hee was sent for Portugal’.25 
 
*** 
England’s intervention in the Portuguese war of independence was driven by several 
factors. Gerald Belcher has demonstrated that Charles II was driven by the need for 
funds to bolster his domestic situation rather than any desire to participate in foreign 
affairs. According to Belcher, the Portuguese offer of a marriage alliance was ‘for 
financial and commercial considerations, too attractive to refuse despite the possible 
implications for Anglo-Spanish relations’.26 Catherine of Braganza’s dowry included 
Tangier, Bombay and trading rights, together with commodities and specie estimated to 
have been worth half a million pounds.27 But the rivalry between France and Spain was 
also a significant consideration. The cold war which had existed between the two 
powers since the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 had as one of its theatres the ongoing 
Portuguese struggle for independence from Spain. The French had encouraged 
Portuguese efforts to hire English veterans, and had even offered to finance Charles II’s 
military commitments arising from his marriage.28 Charles’ ministers for their part saw 
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an opportunity to be rid of large numbers of Cromwellian veterans, together with the 
small pre-Restoration royalist army marooned in Flanders. In addition, many needy 
Cavaliers could now be given employment, with commissions that conveniently 
disqualified them from receiving assistance from the fund then being set up for the relief 
of indigent loyal officers.29 
The infantry that disembarked at Lisbon in June 1662 came almost exclusively 
from the old Army of the Commonwealth. The cavalry were a mixture of ex-
Cromwellians, Irish troopers from Flanders and English adventurers.30 Molesworth was 
disappointed only to secure a captaincy at a time when several senior positions were 
being given to ex-parliamentarians, but in the intense competition for places he was one 
among many.  
From the outset, several factors conspired to reignite Molesworth’s proclivity for 
causing trouble: the pay and supplies Alfonso VI of Portugal had agreed to provide 
were not forthcoming and the civilian population, which had already clashed with 
French volunteers, was ready to murder any soldier rash enough to stray far from camp. 
The unpaid Brigade needed to forage and, as the soldiers were quick to avenge any 
injury, relations with the local community rapidly deteriorated. By November the 
Brigade was suffering from hunger and ‘barbarous treatment’.31 Molesworth, typically, 
had already bypassed his commanders to complain directly to the English ambassador, 
who was none other than his old acquaintance Sir Richard Fanshawe. Their 
correspondence provides evidence of a longstanding friendship: replying on 10 October 
1662, the ambassador divulged sensitive information about negotiations between 
Molesworth’s superiors and the Portuguese, concluding with the sentiment that ‘the 
injunctions of our Brother Gervas Holles (who presents by me his most affectionate 
service to you) will oblige me to remaine allwayes & and in all places your faythfull 
Servant.’32 On 17 November Fanshawe again short-circuited the chain of command, 
sending Molesworth a detailed report of his efforts to secure the Brigade regular pay 
and a fairer price for its supplies. ‘I beseech you’, the ambassador wrote, ‘to impart the 
Contents hereof, as likewise of what I have formerly written you, unto as many there as 
you shall judge requisite.’33 
But Molesworth had deeper grievances: he bitterly resented being required to 
serve alongside Cromwellian veterans, whom he considered rebels and traitors, and 
deprecated the fact that command of the Brigade had been vested in the Earl of 
Inchiquin and his brother, Major-General Christopher O’Brien. Whilst there is no 
evidence that Molesworth objected to the fact that his commanders were Catholics (he 
was after all a member of Fanshawe’s mixed circle) he certainly objected to the fact that 
they were Irish turncoats. Murrough O’Brien, Earl of Inchiquin, although raised as a 
Presbyterian, had served his military apprenticeship in the Spanish army. He had 
campaigned ruthlessly against the Confederacy during the Irish uprising, but during the 
subsequent fighting had regularly switched sides. Although he had gone into exile with 
Charles II, the Earl’s conversion to Catholicism while serving in the French army in 
1657 had alienated many at Charles’ court. In 1659, having lost his position as governor 
of Catalonia (which France had been obliged to cede to Spain) Inchiquin had been in 
transit to Portugal when he had been captured by corsairs. Charles II had secured the 
Earl’s release in 1661 in order to give him command of the Anglo-Irish Brigade. The 
Catholic Inchiquin was a logical choice given that Alfonso’s regime was heavily reliant 
upon the support of church leaders and Portuguese public opinion. It was, however, an 
appointment which quickly caused dissention within the Brigade. 
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 * * * 
On 30 January 1663 Fanshawe received the alarming news that Molesworth and two 
other officers had been arrested. The three had been held incommunicado and without 
charge since 30 December on the orders of Major-General O’Brien. The prisoners 
further claimed that during a move between Moura and Estremos a Captain South had 
led an attempt to murder them.34 Although he had no jurisdiction in military matters, 
Fanshawe moved quickly to intervene. O’Brien had commanded the Brigade since 
November (Inchiquin having been recalled to London for consultations), and the 
ambassador now wrote to him to request that Molesworth be allowed to return to 
England to answer any charges. If he sought thereby to conceal the Brigade’s disunity 
from the Portuguese Fanshawe’s request was a logical one; but he was primarily 
concerned with the fate of Guy Molesworth. Offering to act as surety for his friend, 
Fanshawe declared that he would have done the same for the other officers ‘if I knew 
them as I doe Colonell Molesworth, and withal had received such light of what there is 
to be objected against them, as to know them to bee Baylable’.35 Having failed to gain 
O’Brien’s consent for the court martial to take place in England, the ambassador 
requested that the trial be moved to Lisbon – hardly a move designed to keep the 
incident secret from the Portuguese.36 O’Brien refused, and the court martial convened 
at the Brigade’s headquarters in Moura on 19 February 1663. 
 The president of the court, Colonel James Apsley, was a former royalist who, 
unlike Molesworth, had served contentedly under Goring during the first Civil War.37 
Molesworth faced ten charges, ranging from insubordination to sedition and mutiny. 
Apsley pointed out in his subsequent report to London that the defendant had only 
nominated one witness (bizarrely, this was his alleged would-be assassin Thomas 
South), who had refused to corroborate any counter-accusations against Major-General 
O’Brien.38 
 The prosecution began with the accusation that Molesworth had impugned 
Charles II. Several witnesses testified that they had heard him declare that ‘this party 
were to bee made slaves of or to bee destroy[ed], and ‘that if the kinge had any honest 
Cavaleires hee should send them to bee destroyed in a company of Rebels’.39 Such 
sentiments were all the more damaging for being close to the truth. The pressure on the 
Brigade’s officers to maintain a facade of national harmony was even more evident in 
the fourth article on the charge sheet. A sergeant and three soldiers testified that 
Molesworth had ‘daily disheartened the foote soldiery by tellinge them they were 
Cromwells whelps and Rebels and that they were sent here for murdering the late King 
and were as banished men.’40 It can readily be appreciated that such diatribes would 
have further undermined the morale of troops already suffering from the consequences 
of official neglect.41 The sixth article alleged that Molesworth had mistreated his own 
men. Several officers of Molesworth’s troop appeared as witnesses to confirm that he 
had ‘defrauded many of the troops of their Pay, Corne and Grain and tooke away of 
their horses, and haried of the men wth out a Court martial’.42 Article Seven contained 
an implicit criticism of Fanshawe, as the prosecution claimed that the efforts to have the 
case heard by the Portuguese authorities in Lisbon had been nothing less than an 
attempt ‘to robbe the English of that Liberty wch his Gracious Maty gave unto them to 
be tried by no other but by their own Lawes’.43 
 Particularly serious were charges that Molesworth had attempted to instigate a 
mutiny. The trigger for this had been the withholding of four days’ pay, which several 
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witnesses testified Molesworth had represented to his men as ‘one of the Earle of 
Inchiquins cheetes’. The judges were undecided on whether these comments inter alia 
constituted incitement to mutiny, but Molesworth had been rash enough to distribute 
leaflets among the common soldiers justifying his actions. A witness – the former 
Commonwealth officer Colonel Henry Pearson – produced one of the offending leaflets 
in court.44 
 The prosecution repeatedly emphasised the fact that the main target of 
Molesworth’s vitriol had been Major-General O’Brien. Article Two alleged that 
Molesworth had declared that ‘hee did not know hee [O’Brien] was true to the Kinge in 
any thinge but Rebellion’.45 Article Seven contended that he had repeatedly disobeyed 
O’Brien’s orders. Article Ten alleged that the defendant had publicly declared ‘that if 
Jesus Christ were come from Heavene and were an Irish man hee would not obey 
him’.46 The main charge, also contained in Article Ten, alleged that Molesworth had 
‘abused the whole English Party in insinuatinge to many officers and souldiers in this 
army and in the army of the Portuguez that Major General O Brian intended wth this 
party to runne away to the Enemy’.47 
O’Brien had already delivered himself into Colonel Apsley’s custody, declaring 
that the ‘truth thereof might bee examined before the Court’.48 This somewhat theatrical 
flourish appears to have drawn outside attention to the case and provided ammunition 
for Fanshawe, who had again begun to urge that the affair should be investigated at a 
higher level. In Moura, meanwhile, the court found Molesworth guilty on several counts. 
Twenty officers, including at least one prosecution witness (Henry Pearson), signed a 
document, in which they declared that, 
 
…the penalty of the sayd articles beinge by his Matie ordayned to bee 
death, from which wee have noe Liberty to recede, wee doe hereby order 
that Collonel Guy Molesworth bee shott to death or otherwise punished 
and disposed of accordinge to the will of Major-Generall O’Bryan, for 
whose Mercy wee are supplicants.49 
 
It is clear that the court martial was conducted according to articles of war similar to 
those issued to English forces in Tangier and Dunkirk; however, no copy is listed in the 
State Papers, neither is there an obvious match listed in John Childs’ seminal work on 
the army of Charles II. Apart from the ‘Laws and Ordinances of War’ for ‘his Majesty’s 
Forces in the Kingdoms of Suz, Fez and Morocco’ (1661) noted by Childs, there is a 
reference to a printed set of military regulations dated 4 October 1662 in an order issued 
by the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in 1667.50 Most striking is the fact that the court 
assumed the authority to try Molesworth for seditious talk. Where treason or sedition is 
alluded to in pre-Restoration Articles of War, it is generally in the specific military 
context of betraying intelligence or giving material succour to the enemy.51 Near-
contemporaneous incidents in North Africa stand in marked contrast to the disciplinary 
proceedings instituted against Lieutenant-Colonel Molesworth. Despite the fact that 
Charles II’s forces in Tangier were made up of an equally tinder-dry mixture of ex-
parliamentarians, royalists and Irish Catholics, formal courts martial within that garrison 
were infrequent and appear to have involved only the normal run of military crimes. 
The numerous disputes between Tangier’s officers all appear to have been resolved by 
remarkably lenient disciplinary action, even in those cases where the quarrel had ended 
in violence or death.52 No courts martial arose from blazing rows in 1664 between 
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Tobias Bridges (an ex-New Model Army major), Henry Norwood (a Cavalier-Anglican) 
and the deputy governor Colonel John Fitzgerald, despite the fact that the altercations 
between the Irish Catholic Fitzgerald and his two subordinates are variously described 
as coming close to blows and being ‘very high on both sides’.53 Given that the Tangier 
garrison was hugely outnumbered, and under almost constant attack from Moorish 
forces, it may be that differences of opinion were invariably put aside when faced with 
more immediate matters of mutual concern in the daily struggle for survival. The 
condition of the Anglo-Irish Brigade in Portugal was scarcely less desperate, and, as 
will be shown, there was considerable unity between the bulk of the officers despite 
their very different religious and ideological backgrounds. But whilst no records of any 
court martial exist for the other two officers held at Estremos, Nicholas Pendennis and 
John Crossman, it is evident that Christopher O’Brien, supported by his senior 
commanders, intended to make an example of Guy Molesworth. In airing his prejudices 
so vociferously to fellow officers, in attempting to influence the common soldiers and 
particularly in communicating his suspicions to their Portuguese hosts, Molesworth had 
gone considerably further in his personal vendetta against his superiors than had any 
other argumentative officer in Tangier or Portugal. Nevertheless, as Barbara Donagan 
has written, even during the trials of parliamentarian officers in Oxford during the first 
Civil War, ‘the distinction between civil and military guilt… presented problems that 
were to dog future debates over pardon, indemnity and oblivion’.54 In 1663 these 
debates were in full swing, driven by Cavalier-Anglican reactionaries opposed to the 
toleration of former enemies.55 Given that some observers were already claiming that 
the Restoration government’s neglect of ex-royalist officers was ‘a Table-talk in most 
parts of Christendom’, the furore which would have followed the execution of a much-
wounded royalist veteran at the hands of ex-Cromwellians and Irish Catholics can 
readily be imagined.56 It is therefore unsurprising that the death sentence from which the 
judges claimed they had ‘noe Liberty to recede’ was quietly forgotten: Apsley’s report 
referred only to the defendant’s ‘misdemeanour’ in slandering Major-General O’Brien, 
and claimed that the recommendation of the court had been that he should be 
disgracefully dismissed.57 
The respective demeanours of the principal protagonists by mid-March show the 
extent to which the balance of power had shifted. Alarmed by rumours of large-scale 
defections to the Spanish, the Portuguese had now set up a commission of inquiry. 
Fanshawe began to exert more influence as soon as matters moved to Lisbon. He 
quickly obtained Molesworth’s release, and a pass to return to England to ‘make good 
his owne defence and to make good any Chardge hee hath against others’.58 But 
Molesworth immediately began to cause more trouble. On 17 March, O’Brien burst into 
Fanshawe’s residence, berated the ambassador for his meddling, and complained that 
Molesworth was at that moment 
 
…inveighing in all companies heer against the authority and proceedings 
of the Councell of Warr, against his brother the Earl of Insiquin, and 
against himselfe the sayd Major Generall, particularly tht hee should 
have designes and debated upon the manner how to pass over with the 
English to the Spanyards.59 
 
Fanshawe’s subsequent letter to Molesworth indicates that even his patience was 
wearing thin. Relaying O’Brien’s reluctant assent to the inquiry in Lisbon, the 
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ambassador observed tartly that by this means ‘whosever shall bee found faultie may be 
censured accordingly; and not in liberall discourses among private persons’.60  
 O’Brien had also alleged that Molesworth had gone so far as to plot against his 
life. The ever-loyal Fanshawe had retorted that Molesworth ‘and some others had 
mentioned to mee the like warning given to [him] and them from lay-hands, intimatinge 
moreover, tht the killing the other day of Captain Tresheyr was upon such an accompt 
by a contrary partie’.61 Tresheyr, or Tresaire, a junior officer in the Brigade, had died 
two weeks earlier at the hands of an English civilian named Stanley and rumours were 
circulating around Lisbon that this was no innocent quarrel. On 4 March, Captain John 
Belasyse had submitted a deposition claiming that Tresaire had been murdered and that 
just before his death the deceased had been attempting to convince fellow officers of 
O’Brien’s intention to take the Brigade over to the Spanish. It was when Tresaire had 
threatened to take his suspicions to the authorities, Belasyse asserted, that he had been 
slain.62 Fanshawe could hardly bring himself to contemplate the possibility that officers 
within the Brigade might actually be murdering one another; nonetheless, he took the 
precaution of warning Molesworth: ‘god forbid it should come to that, to the shame of 
Fellow-Subjects in the eyes of a forreigne nation, and certain chastizement to ensue (if 
not now here, yet from our Royall Master hereafter).’63 
The next day, 18 March, the Lisbon commissioners ordered the arrest of Major-
General O’Brien.64 Enraged, senior officers in the Brigade rode to Lisbon en masse to 
declare their support for their commander. Thomas Maynard, the English consul in 
Lisbon, wrote to Sir Henry Bennet, Secretary of State, on 31 March to report that ‘there 
are now 10 or 12 of the Principal Commanders in Towne, whoe all proteste they believe 
that he is infinitely abused, and that this Charge is maliciously made by some of the 
officers under his Command’.65 Maynard assured Bennet that he could not believe 
either Molesworth or Belasyse guilty of baseless malice, but it should be noted that the 
consul was an ex-parliamentarian whose career had come to depend largely upon 
Fanshawe’s favour. He had in addition publicly fraternised with Molesworth in Lisbon 
after the colonel’s release.66 
Several junior officers of the Brigade also wrote to declare their support for 
O’Brien; some specifically in order to challenge Belasyse’s version of Tresaire’s demise. 
By now, however, the Lisbon commission had become more interested in collecting 
testimony from Molesworth’s allies such as Belasyse and Lieutenant Joseph White, in 
order to amass evidence that would retrospectively justify O’Brien’s arrest.67 
Fanshawe’s letters during this period betray a growing sense of unease as the 
political cost of supporting Molesworth became increasingly apparent. Given that he 
had been largely responsible for O’Brien’s downfall, the ambassador’s letter to Sir 
Henry Bennet of 31 March is a masterpiece of back-pedalling. Despite admitting that he 
had endorsed Lisbon’s decision to arrest O’Brien, Fanshawe indicated that he had had 
reservations; yet, he pleaded, in the interests of international relations it was ‘very unfit 
for mee either openly to oppose, or so much as inwardly to censure the jealousies of a 
Crowne in such a case when it hath all at stake in the instantly approaching 
Campai[gn]’.68 It seems evident that Fanshawe hoped to obfuscate the fact that in his 
eagerness to protect Molesworth he had encouraged the Portuguese to interfere directly 
in the internal affairs of the Brigade. It was harder to gloss over the fact that Major-
General O’Brien was now in Portuguese custody, with even Fanshawe himself denied 
access.69 The ambassador’s inference had had an even more significant consequence, in 
that Portuguese confidence had been so shaken by the allegations against O’Brien that 
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Alfonso’s ministers resolved thereafter to refuse the offer of any further troops from 
Ireland, on the grounds that these were likely to desert to the Spanish.70 
If Molesworth’s network in Portugal was now showing signs of strain his relatives 
in England were beginning to make headway. In mid-April, just as Fanshawe was 
completing arrangements for the return of Molesworth and O’Brien to London, Gervase 
Holles presented Charles II with a petition from Anne Molesworth on behalf of her 
husband.71 Inevitably, given the normal delays in receiving news from Portugal, the 
scenario she described was several weeks out of date. The wording of Holles’ 
endorsement on the document, dated 15 April, similarly indicates that King Alfonso’s 
letter advising of O’Brien’s arrest, dated Lisbon 29 March (19 March in London), had 
not yet arrived in Whitehall.72 Nevertheless, the family network had achieved the 
important objective of bringing Molesworth’s predicament to the personal attention of 
Charles II. Although all official correspondence relating to the affair had hitherto passed 
between Fanshawe, Maynard and Bennet, certain details in Anne Molesworth’s petition 
indicate that the ambassador had also alerted Holles – who was ideally placed not only 
to promote his sister-in-law’s petition, but also to apprise Inchiquin’s enemies at Court. 
O’Brien’s petition to the King soon after his arrival in England refers to just such a 
whispering campaign. The scandals and calumnies that had already been cast upon him, 
he complained, had been ‘much augmented and agravated in England far beyond what 
is unjustly layd on him in Portugall.’73 
Despite the gravity of the issues involved there was no public discussion of the 
unfolding drama in London. The news-books were largely dependent upon official 
sources for overseas news and Sir Henry Bennet controlled their editors to such a degree 
that he could ensure that nothing untoward found its way into print. In private discourse 
among the informed political elite, by contrast, the case appears to have excited 
considerable interest. Joseph Williamson apprised the Marquis of Ormond of 
developments on 16 May 1663, and at least one private newsletter had carried a report 
on the situation a week earlier.74 Thus, while the inquiry was followed keenly in some 
quarters, most around Whitehall remained blissfully unaware of events. 
The inquiry commenced at the Cockpit – the octagonal theatre complex situated 
on the outskirts of Whitehall palace – on 5 May 1663. Unhappily for O’Brien, the two 
commissioners appointed were the Duke of Albemarle and Sir Henry Bennet. Apart 
from his long acquaintance with Molesworth, Albemarle had recently favoured the 
Holles family, issuing a commission for Holles’ son from his private chambers in the 
Cockpit only four months earlier. These chambers now offered a suitably discrete venue 
to examine the dispute.75 Fanshawe had furnished Albemarle and Bennet with a dossier 
detailing the allegations made against O’Brien in Portugal and this now guided their line 
of questioning.76 One of the documents contained a detailed account of how Inchiquin 
and O’Brien had intended to ‘debauch’ the Brigade and how they were to be rewarded 
for their treachery.77 Such precise and fulsome intelligence was almost certainly too 
good to be true, but the commissioners could not afford to ignore it: Inchiquin had made 
many contacts during his military career, and he had been successful in enticing Irish 
troops to defect from Spanish service in Catalonia. Having by now returned to Ireland, 
the Earl provided the inquiry with written testimony. 
If the respective networks of Guy Molesworth and Christopher O’Brien had 
been evenly matched in Portugal in terms of influence and numbers the contrast 
between the two parties in England was startling. Molesworth’s friends and relatives 
had proved loyal and industrious, and had been effective in promoting the colonel’s 
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interests in both countries. O’Brien on leaving Portugal had been detached from his 
vociferous supporters in the Brigade and was now entirely reliant on the support of 
Inchiquin. But Inchiquin was himself isolated at Court and politically vulnerable, a 
situation which had perhaps arisen as much from his chequered personal reputation as it 
had from nationality or religion; after all, another Catholic Irishman, Colonel John 
Fitzgerald, for all that his recalcitrant subordinates in Tangier and detractors in 
Whitehall might disparage him as ‘a man of no honour nor presence, nor little honesty, 
[who] endeavours to raise the Irish and supress the English interest there’, could rest 
secure knowing that he was well protected by courtiers such as Viscount Hardinge and 
the Duke of York.78 Thus it was that far from giving his beleaguered brother an 
unequivocal endorsement Inchiquin’s first priority was to protect his own skin. In an 
earlier confidential interview with Charles II, Inchiquin had made the proposal that the 
starving Brigade should be allowed to pass through the Spanish lines to find 
employment elsewhere. Belatedly acquainting Bennet with this information, the Earl 
stressed that he had ‘never recommended any treachery; and no ill treatment could 
justify my brother in permitting it’.79 Worse still for O’Brien, in the course of his 
testimony Inchiquin had inadvertently substantiated Molesworth’s accusation that the 
brothers had been approached by the Spanish but had not subsequently informed their 
superiors. 
 O’Brien, meanwhile, attempted to portray his detractors as a gang of 
malcontents. When asked about the circumstances surrounding Captain Tresaire’s death, 
the major-general replied that Tresaire had been killed in a simple quarrel over a wager. 
He suggested that Belasyse had attempted to implicate him in the killing because the 
captain had been cashiered some time before by his brother Inchiquin. He observed that 
Lieutenant White had originally come to Portugal in Guy Molesworth’s entourage.80 
But despite the circumstantial nature of the evidence against him O’Brien was unable to 
convince Albemarle and Bennet of his innocence. 
 Four months after the Cockpit inquiry, Inchiquin petitioned Charles II to 
complain that his brother was still under close arrest. Having investigated Inchiquin’s 
claim that this continued detention was at the insistence of the Portuguese authorities, 
the King pronounced O’Brien’s detractors in Lisbon to be largely responsible. It is hard 
to believe that he meant anyone other than Fanshawe and his allies. Bennet had also 
shown himself disinclined to act in O’Brien’s favour, having ignored a personal plea 
from the major-general soon after the inquiry that he be sentenced or released.81 It is 
noteworthy, therefore, that Charles now ordered Bennet to endorse Inchiquin’s petition 
with the statement that the Portuguese had been unduly influenced by O’Brien’s 
enemies. ‘His Matie… hath commanded mee’, Bennet further wrote, ‘to declare that he 
finds no cause to lessen the good opinion he hath of the Earle of Inchiquin or his 
Brother’, and intended to ‘doe all things that shall offer themselves for their honr & 
advantage.’82 Such an emphatic intervention went beyond Charles’s normal light touch, 
and Bennet’s palpable discomfort illustrates how even powerful Restoration courtiers 
needed to take care how they involved themselves in the machinations of their inferiors. 
The activities of Molesworth’s network had caused problems far beyond Whitehall, 
bringing royal displeasure on all concerned. However, despite this and the fact that 
Molesworth had been convicted of uttering reproachful words against him, Charles II 
granted the colonel a personal interview. The details of the interview have not survived, 
but Molesworth was later adamant that Charles had concluded by promising to ‘take all 
occasions to do him good’.83 
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* * * 
 
Molesworth’s recurrent financial problems and incessant petitioning in the decades 
following the Portuguese affair appear to offer a stereotypical picture of a neglected 
Cavalier suffering at the hands of a perfidious and ungrateful state; certainly this was 
Molesworth’s constant theme in his petitions after 1663, describing himself at one point 
as ‘a monument of most unremarkable unprosperous Loyalty.’84 His request on 30 May 
1663 for a share of the profits arising from the sale of some impounded slaves, for 
example, met with a lukewarm response;85 but then he had recently been at the epicentre 
of an affair that had caused huge disruption within the command structure of the Anglo-
Irish forces in Portugal, undermined relations between Whitehall and Lisbon, and upset 
the delicate balance of factions at Charles’ court. In addition, Inchiquin and O’Brien – 
two servants considerably more useful to Charles II than Molesworth – had been 
sufficiently tainted by the colonel’s allegations as to be rendered unemployable. 
Fanshawe and Holles would also soon experience a downturn in their respective 
careers, although in neither case was this ostensibly connected with the Portuguese 
affair. Fanshawe was recalled to London in August 1663, and following a series of 
interviews with Charles was actually made a privy councillor. Nonetheless, in early 
1664 he was removed from his post in Lisbon and replaced by Sir Robert Southwell – 
an Irish-born Protestant with the ear of Inchiquin.86 Fanshawe was ordered to Madrid, 
where he died in May 1666 soon after he had again lost his position, having exceeded 
his authority by concluding a treaty with Spain. Holles, meanwhile, had suffered 
following a tussle with Bennet regarding their respective rights to present petitions to 
the King.87 Even Molesworth deserted him to solicit the patronage of Bennet (created 
Baron Arlington in 1665), for which the colonel was rewarded with an occasional 
portion of royal bounty and a share in a lottery scheme run in Ireland for the benefit of 
impoverished ex-royalist officers.88   
Molesworth’s petition of December 1666 was typical of those which he would 
submit to Charles II over the coming years, with details of his ‘five and twenty wounds’ 
incurred in the course of allegedly unblemished service to Charles I and a sanitised 
description of the internecine struggle on Barbados which had caused him to be 
‘banished & totally ruined for his loyalty’.89 As regards his time in Portugal, 
Molesworth pleaded that he had served to ‘the satisfaction of his Matie of Portugall’, 
but made no mention of the court martial or the dispute with O’Brien. He reminded the 
King that, 
 
…at the Pets returne from Portugall, your Matie was Gratiously pleased 
to promise the Petr that your Matie would take all occasions to do him 
good. But so it is may it please your Matie that the Petr wants nere after 
three yeares attendance & his unprofitable voyage hath ingaged the Petr 
& his unhappy family in so great necessity as can be imagined.90 
 
Interestingly, although he would remind the Crown of its moral obligations on several 
future occasions, Portugal was never mentioned in any subsequent petition. 
 Invariably Molesworth’s constant request was for gainful employment. In late 
1667, with the state at war and desperate for experienced officers, he was given a 
commission in the foot regiment of William, Lord Alington. But the Second Dutch War 
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was short-lived, and the regiment was soon disbanded under the terms of the Treaty of 
Breda.91 By November 1668, Molesworth was at least partly restored to royal favour 
when the King responded favourably to a request for a life appointment as Keeper of the 
Customs House in London, ‘much compassionating this Gentleman’s Wants, and 
remembering how well he has on all occasions served his Maty & his late Royall Father 
in the whole course of the late Rebellion’.92 A permanent appointment remained elusive, 
however, and in September 1669 Molesworth made strenuous efforts to enlist support at 
Court. Given his impoverished state and his political insignificance his ability to 
network within the highest levels of government is remarkable. On 6 September he 
informed Arlington’s associate Joseph Williamson, 
 
Be pleased to continue your goodness to me in acquainting my Good 
Lord Arlington that I humbly moved His Grace the Duke of Albemarle 
with my Lords noble psuasione to joyne with the Duke [of York] in 
moving His Matie for favor and ease for me in my sad condition wch 
His Grace hath bin pleased to promise me.93 
 
As a result of this impressive array of supporters, the King promised Molesworth the 
next company that fell vacant in the army, although whether he ever intended to honour 
this promise is debatable. A suitable post was eventually found when the colonel was 
appointed warehouse keeper in the Port of London in December 1671.94 Molesworth’s 
financial problems were such, however, that within months he found himself in debtors’ 
prison. His next petition, for all its deferential language, expressed frustration that no 
less than six foot companies had been allotted new commanders since he had been 
promised one in September 1669. As a result, Molesworth claimed, he was ‘reduced to 
that misery that he must starve in Prison with his wife and three daughters who are 
growne women without yor Mats Mercy and Bounty’.95 Records show that Molesworth 
was able to resume his duties at the Port of London by December 1673.96 In October 
1674 his powers of persuasion were still sufficiently potent to move the Earl of Danby 
to speak to the King on his behalf, resulting in a bounty of £200.97 Guy Molesworth’s 
last appearance in the archives is dated March 1676, when his warehouse keeper’s 
salary was confirmed.98 The events of the Portuguese campaign and the exploits of the 
Anglo-Irish Brigade had long since faded from memory. 
  
* * * 
 
How could the intemperate behaviour of such a minor figure as Guy Molesworth have 
had such far-reaching consequences that it ultimately precipitated high-level 
commissions in Lisbon and Whitehall and the personal intervention of Charles II? The 
very composition of the forces deployed in Portugal and Tangier exemplify the 
problems facing the newly-restored British monarchy. It was imperative that the Crown 
dispose of Cromwell’s old regiments and the predominantly Irish royalist units in 
Flanders as quickly as possible. There were obvious hazards in brigading them together 
in any theatre of operations, but the establishment of an exclusively ex-Cromwellian or 
Irish Catholic force in either Tangier or Portugal would have exposed Charles II to even 
worse criticism; as it was, there were many around Whitehall, like Pepys’ friend Mr 
Cholmely, ready to believe that John Fitzgerald, the deputy governor of Tangier, was 
bent on turning that colony into a nest of papists.99 It was therefore politically expedient 
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to ensure that the forces be mixed, and entirely predictable that the Crown should also 
seek to appoint a body of ex-royalist English officers sufficient to assure the political 
nation that matters in Portugal and Tangier would be largely in the hands of men of 
proven loyalty. There was an added bonus in that these appointments, together with the 
1663 fund for indigent loyalist officers, went some way towards acknowledging Charles 
II’s moral debt to those who had fought and suffered for the royalist cause during the 
Civil Wars and Interregnum. Molesworth, by virtue of his professional military 
background, undoubted fidelity and financial need, was in many ways an ideal 
candidate, although several of those who approved the appointments to the Anglo-Irish 
Brigade would have been well aware of his shortcomings. Albemarle, Rupert and 
Charles II all knew that in addition to his extensive military experience and devotion to 
the Crown the colonel was quarrelsome, meddlesome, impetuous and disdainful of 
authority. However, although his previous altercations had each caused a certain amount 
of fuss in their time, these had been essentially localised incidents which had only 
carried significant consequences for Molesworth and his immediate family. That the 
Portuguese affair proved far more serious was due to the conjunction of several factors. 
First and foremost the regimes in Lisbon and Whitehall were both extraordinarily 
fragile in 1663. Alfonso VI’s government was threatened from within by the intrigues 
of courtiers and church leaders and from without by a Spain no longer distracted by war 
with France. In England, Charles II, with the monarchy still only recently restored and 
facing all manner of challenges, had an urgent need for income. This imperative lay at 
the core of negotiations to marry Charles to Catherine of Briganza. In 1663 much of the 
promised dowry had still not been paid; indeed, one of the main priorities of successive 
English ambassadors to Lisbon was to pursue the matter.  
 From Whitehall’s perspective, then, the significance of the Anglo-Irish Brigade 
was twofold: firstly, it demonstrated England’s commitment to the alliance (thereby 
reassuring Alfonso’s ministers and encouraging settlement of the unpaid dowry); 
secondly, it was a receptacle into which the Restoration regime could deposit thousands 
of unwanted soldiers left over from the conflicts of the previous two decades. 
Molesworth was right to regard this volatile mixture of former Cromwellians, ex-
royalists and Irish Catholics ‘as banished men’.100 The men were not required to 
perform heroic deeds (although they did so on numerous occasions) nor make a 
particularly significant contribution to the Portuguese war effort. The officers were 
expected to maintain discipline and ensure that the Brigade did nothing to alarm their 
hosts. That the French also had a vested interest in the conduct of the Brigade is 
indicated by the critical comments offered by the commander of the French contingent 
in Portugal, Count Schomberg, during a visit to London in 1662.101 Any credible 
suggestion that the commanders of the Brigade were plotting to take their soldiers over 
to the Spanish was therefore bound to have immediate and serious repercussions. 
 Even within this sensitive environment Molesworth’s activities might have 
caused relatively little disruption had he not been an intimate friend of Sir Richard 
Fanshawe and a relation of Gervase Holles. Major-General Christopher O’Brien did all 
he could to contain the problem, firstly by holding Molesworth and the other accused 
officers incommunicado and then by insisting that the court martial remain an internal 
matter. The death sentence handed down in Moura was always liable to be commuted, 
given Molesworth’s contacts and his history of service to the Crown; but Fanshawe’s 
meddling gave his friend licence to spread rumour and gossip in Lisbon and by his 
continued support gave credence to the allegations against O’Brien. Given the political 
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and commercial stakes involved in the Portuguese alliance, anything which concerned 
the Lisbon authorities naturally concerned Whitehall. Even once the two antagonists 
had been safely extracted from Portugal, despite Charles II’s efforts to redress the 
balance, the fact that O’Brien was isolated and Molesworth well supported influenced 
the chain of events during the Cockpit inquiry and its aftermath. John Miller has noted 
that although Charles II employed a number of Catholic officers in the early part of his 
reign, he became noticeably less eager to do so as feelings of anti-popery intensified.102 
Although the affair was kept out of the public eye in England, and although Molesworth 
is not recorded as having cast any aspersions on O’Brien’s religion, the tensions which 
had been revealed, and the speed with which the problem had escalated proved a clear 
concern for a monarch whose most earnest desire was always political equilibrium. 
County lieutenancy papers and Quarter Sessions records show that the Restoration 
authorities took a close interest in the activities of even the humblest of the King’s 
erstwhile enemies.103 In the 1660s at least, they appear to have under-estimated the 
capacity of Charles I’s old Cavaliers to cause comparable trouble.104 In fact, as the 
principal supporters of the restored Church and State, it could be argued that disgruntled 
Cavaliers possessed more potential to derail the Restoration than Fifth Monarchists, 
Quakers or any of the other radicals who featured in the reports regularly submitted to 
Sir Henry Bennet. As the Molesworth affair demonstrates, in contrast to the ineffectual 
republican coterie headed by Edmund Ludlow, Cavalier networks were genuinely able 
to operate in an international context, stretching all the way from a prison cell in 
Estremos to the corridors of Whitehall. Molesworth’s history suggested that he was 
always likely to be a source of friction in Portugal, but it did not lead the authorities to 
suspect that he would prove to be the catalyst for a full-blown international incident; 
however, in considering whether he was a suitable person to hold a commission in the 
Anglo-Irish Brigade the authorities would have done well to have remembered that Guy 
Molesworth was not an individual but the centre of a network. 
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